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Abstract  —  Under  Kyoto,  biological  activities  that 
sequester carbon can be used to create CO2 offset credits 
that  could  obviate  the  need  for  lifestyle-changing 
reductions  in  fossil  fuel  use.  Credits  are  earned  by 
storing  carbon  in  terrestrial  ecosystems  and  wood 
products, although CO2 emissions are also mitigated by 
delaying deforestation, which accounts for one-quarter 
of  anthropogenic  CO2  emissions.  However,  non-
permanent carbon offsets from biological activities are 
difficult to compare with each other and with emissions 
reduction because they differ in how long they prevent 
CO2 from entering the atmosphere. This is the duration 
problem; it results in uncertainty and makes it difficult 
to  determine  the  legitimacy  of  biological  activities  in 
mitigating climate change. While there is not doubt that 
biological  sink  activities  help  mitigate  climate  change 
and  should  not  be  neglected,  in  this  paper  we 
demonstrate that these activities cannot be included in 
carbon trading schemes. 
Keywords — carbon offset credits, climate change, 
duration of carbon sinks. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Policy  makers  are  particularly  enthusiastic  about 
sequestering carbon in terrestrial ecosystems or storing 
it  in  geological  reservoirs,  thereby  creating  CO2 
offsets  that  could  obviate  the  need  for  lifestyle-
changing reductions in fossil fuel use. Some scientists 
claim  that,  by  converting  marginal  croplands  to 
permanent  grasslands  or  forests,  the  accompanying 
increase in biomass and soil organic carbon can offset 
20% or more of countries’ fossil fuel emissions [1, 2, 
3]. The Government of Canada [4] had planned to rely 
on tree planting and improved forest management for 
meeting  some  one-third  of  its  Kyoto  commitment, 
although subsequent losses of large swaths of timber 
to Mountain Pine Beetle and wildfire greatly reduced 
the contribution that can be expected from forests.  
 
Proponents  of  CO2  capture  and  storage  in  deep 
underground  aquifers  and  abandoned  oil/gas  fields 
indicate that there is enough available storage to trap 
decades of CO2 emissions [5]. The costs of this option 
are unknown as there is a risk of a sudden release of 
deadly concentrations of CO2 in the future – a cost to 
be evaluated by the  willingness of people to pay to 
avoid such a risk and not unlike that associated with 
long-term  storage  of  nuclear  waste,  which  could  be 
substantial (see [6]). 
There  is  no  lack  of  schemes  to  generate  carbon 
credits  through  terrestrial  activities.  Even  a  cursory 
investigation finds there are many ‘sellers’ of carbon 
offset credits. Examples include: 
•  Greenfleet  (http://www.greenfleet.com.au/green 
fleet/objectives.asp,  viewed  19  Oct  2007). 
“For $40 (tax deductible), Greenfleet will plant 17 
native trees on your behalf. These trees will help 
to create a forest, and as they grow will absorb the 
greenhouse  gases  that  your  car  produces  in  one 
year (based on 4.36 tonnes of CO2 for the average 
car)”. This project is designed to increase planting 
of  native  species  in  Australia.  Sale  of  carbon 
credits  would  help  pay  for  tree  planting,  at  a 
presumed  cost  of  approximately  US$0.82  per 
tCO2,  although,  there  is  insufficient  information 
about the timing of carbon uptake and release to 
determine the true cost. 
•  Trees  for  Life  (http://www.treesforlife.org.uk/ 
tfl.global_warming.html,  viewed  19  Oct  2007). 
This  is  a  conservation  charity  dedicated  to  the 
regeneration  and  restoration  of  the  Caledonian 
Forest  in  the  Highlands  of  Scotland.  It  uses  the 
idea  of  a  carbon  footprint  to  solicit  donations: 
“Rather than claiming to help you become ‘carbon 
neutral,’ we offer you the chance to make a real 
difference  and  become  Carbon  Conscious”. 
Donations of £60 ($120), £140 ($280) and £280 
($360)  are  solicited  depending  on  whether  your   2 
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‘carbon footprint’ is rated as low, intermediate or 
high  (a  guide  is  provided).  For  each  £5  ($10) 
donation, Trees for Life claims to plant one tree. 
No other details are available. 
•  Haida  Gwaii  Climate  Forest  Pilot  Project 
(http://www.haidaclimate.com/,  viewed  3  Nov 
2006):  The  Haida-Gwaii  First  Nation  needs  to 
restore  some  5,000  to  10,000  ha  of  degraded 
riparian  habitat;  starting  with  some  1,000-1,500 
ha, they hope to fund the project by selling carbon 
credits.  The  idea  is  to  remove  alder  that  is 
“growing in an un-natural manner” and replace it 
with the preferred mixed-conifer climax rainforest 
that  existed  before  clear-cutting  some  50  years 
ago. The eventual old-growth forest will sequester 
1928-2454 tCO2 per ha; labour cost is estimated to 
be  $15.92  million,  or  $6.49-$8.26  per  tCO2.  No 
other cost is provided and there is no indication 
about the timing of carbon uptake or potential for 
future  release,  or  loss  of  carbon  from  removing 
alder. 
Whether or not these planting programs are or will be 
certified,  current  information  on  projects  is 
incomplete: it is not possible to determine how much 
carbon is sequestered for how long. Unless the timing 
of carbon uptake and release is known, it is impossible 
to  know  how  many  credits  are  created  for  sale  in 
carbon  markets.  This  we  refer  to  as  the  duration 
problem. 
Given  that  the  Haida  Gwaii  are  committed  to 
restoring ancient forests because they are part of their 
cultural heritage, and that Trees for Life is committed 
to restoring the Caledonian Forest, the sale of carbon 
credits is no more than a marketing technique to solicit 
funds for a project that would proceed in any event.
1 
Such projects would be additional only if they would 
                                                         
1  There  are  many  efforts  to  gain  carbon  credits  for  ongoing  or 
planned forestry activities. Two groups approached the author for 
advice  on  obtaining  carbon  credits.  The  Little  Red  River  Cree 
Nation located in northern Alberta, Canada, sought tradable carbon 
permits  for  delaying  the  harvest  of  forests  under  their 
management. The delay was the result of a poor price outlook, and 
the  request  was  subsequently  turned  down  by  the  Canadian 
government.  A  community  group  in  Powell  River,  British 
Columbia,  hopes  to  obtain  carbon  credits  to  fund  activities  to 
prevent the harvest of coastal rainforest. Neither project provides 
additional  carbon  uptake  services,  but  they  do  illustrate  the 
potential for rent seeking via dubious carbon sink projects.  
not proceed in the absence of CO2 offset payments, 
and that is difficult to demonstrate. 
The forgoing are not the only questionable projects 
that aim to remove CO2 from the atmosphere rather 
than  prevent  it  from  being  released  to  begin  with. 
Many  CDM-initiated  forestry  activities  also  seek  to 
create (tradable) carbon credits, as do forestry projects 
in developed nations. Some projects are simply funded 
by international agencies, or ‘picked up’ by companies 
seeking  to  improve  their  corporate  image.  Yet, 
projects fail to identify all of the carbon sequestration 
costs, the future path of carbon uptake and harvests, 
the risks of forest denudation, and so forth. Are they 
really contributing to climate mitigation? 
In a review of terrestrial carbon sequestration, the 
FAO [7] examined 49 projects that were underway or 
proposed to create offset credits. Forty-three were in 
developing countries and eligible for CDM credits – 
38 were forestry projects, of which 17 involved forest 
conservation. While all projects had local or offshore 
sponsors and/or investors (a country and/or company), 
only 33 of the 49 projects managed to provide some 
information  on  the  amount  of  carbon  to  be 
sequestered. Data on the amount of carbon sequestered 
could  be  considered  ‘good’  for  only  24  projects, 
although none provided an indication of the timing of 
carbon benefits. Information on costs was provided for 
only 11 projects.  
Determining the duration that CO2 is removed from 
the  atmosphere  is  a  problem  for  terrestrial  projects. 
Carbon  offset  credits  from  agricultural  activities  are 
particularly ephemeral, while CO2 capture and storage 
might  almost  be  considered  permanent;  forestry 
activities  lead  to  carbon  sinks  that  have  a  more 
intermediary  duration.  Most  commentators  believe 
that  the  carbon  embodied  in  forests  and,  especially, 
agricultural ecosystems (grass and soils) is always at 
risk  of  accidental  or  deliberate  release,  but  that 
avoided emissions are permanent, despite the fact that 
‘saved’ fossil fuels might release stored CO2 at some 
future date [8].  
There is no denying that terrestrial activities create 
non-permanent  carbon  offsets,  but  they  create 
problems  for  policy  makers  who  wish  to  compare 
mitigation strategies that differ in the length of time 
they withhold CO2 from entering the atmosphere. But 
how  should  markets  for  emissions  trading  value   3 
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permanence? More specifically, how have producers 
of carbon offsets from forestry activities determined 
the value of these credits?  And  what guarantees are 
there  that  forest-generated  credits  are  cheaper  than 
emission reduction offsets? 
In  the  remainder  of  this  paper  we  investigate  the 
role  of  duration  in  greater  detail.  This  is  done  by 
expanding in comprehensive fashion on earlier work 
by  Marland  et  al.  [9],  Sedjo  and  Marland  [10],  and 
Herzog  et  al.  [8].  In  particular,  we  compare  carbon 
mitigation  activities  according  to how  long  they  are 
able to lower CO2 levels in the atmosphere.  This is 
important  because  storage  times  differ  even  among 
terrestrial activities, with some being more permanent 
than others.  
In  the  next  section,  we  consider  economic  issues 
regarding the role of terrestrial carbon sinks. We then 
investigate  the  implications  of  non-permanence  of 
biological  sinks  in  a  formal  fashion  to  determine 
whether  the  stop-gap  nature  of  forestry  activities 
makes it more burdensome for producers and buyers 
of  temporary  carbon  offsets  to  value  such  credits, 
thereby  adding  to  transaction  costs  and  inhibiting 
trades. This is not the same as asking whether forestry 
activities  can  make  a  reasonable  and  useful 
contribution to a country’s overall mitigation strategy, 
although it does shed light on this issue. The formal 
analysis  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  its  policy 
implications.  We  end  with  some  concluding 
observations. 
II. DURATION: NON-PERMANENCE OF 
GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION 
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
activities  remove  carbon  from  the  atmosphere  and 
store  it  in  biomass,  and,  under  Kyoto,  are  eligible 
activities  for  creating  carbon  offset  credits.  Tree 
planting  and  activities  that  enhance  tree  growth  are 
among the most important,  although tree plantations 
release  a  substantial  amount  of  their  stored  carbon 
once harvested, which could happen as soon as five 
years  after  establishment  for  some  fast-growing 
species. Sequestered carbon might also be released as 
a  result  of  wildfire,  disease  or  pests  (e.g.,  mountain 
pine beetle infestation in British Columbia). 
Based on a meta-regression analysis of 68 studies, 
van Kooten and Sohngen [11] estimated the potential 
marginal  costs  of  creating  carbon  offset  credits  via 
different  forestry  activities.  These  are  provided  in 
Table 1, but they ignore transaction costs In many of 
the studies included in the analysis, and particularly 
for  a  large  number  of  studies  not  included  in  the 
analysis  because  of  lack  of  information,  the  actual 
number of offset credits (as opposed to total carbon) 
that could be counted as part of the project was not 
available.  Less  than  10%  of  studies  provided 
information on the duration that carbon was retained 
in  sinks.  Even  so,  given  that  utility  companies  are 
banking on carbon credits costing no more than $20 
per metric ton of CO2 (see [12]), many forest activities 
are not competitive with emissions reduction because 
the opportunity cost of land is generally too high. This 
holds even when account is taken of carbon stored in 
wood  products.  Not  surprisingly,  because  of  lower 
land  costs,  tree  planting  in  the  tropics  and  some 
activities  in  the  boreal  region  might  be  worth 
undertaking, as well as some U.S. projects. The only 
other exception occurs when trees are harvested and 
burned in place of fossil fuels to generate electricity, 
and then not in all locations. Of course, none of these 
estimates include transaction costs which could easily 
double the costs in Table 1. 
Table 1 Marginal Costs of Creating Carbon Offset Credits 
through Forestry Activities, Various Forestry Activities and 
Regions, $/tCO2; Source: Adapted from [11] 
  Region 
Activity  Global  Europe  Boreal  Tropics 




$0-49  $115-187  $1-90  $0-23 
Forest 
management  





$48-77  $203-219  $44-108  $0-50 
Forest 
conservation  $47-195  n.a.  n.a.  $26-136 
 
Agricultural  activities  that  enhance  soil  organic 
carbon and store carbon in biomass are also eligible 
means to create offset credits. Included under Kyoto   4 
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are  re-vegetation  (establishment  of  vegetation  that 
does  not  meet  the  definitions  of  afforestation  and 
reforestation),  cropland  management  (greater  use  of 
conservation  tillage,  more  set  asides)  and  grazing 
management (manipulation of the amount and type of 
vegetation  and  livestock  produced).  Most  of  these 
activities  provide  temporary  offsets  only.  One  study 
reported,  for  example,  that  all  of  the  soil  organic 
carbon stored as a result of 20 years of conservation 
tillage was released in a single year of conventional 
tillage [13].  
During  the  1990s,  farmers  increasingly  adopted 
conservation tillage practices, particularly zero tillage 
cropping. There is concern that these soil conservation 
practices  could  be  reversed  at  any  time  as  a 
consequence  of  changes  in  prices  and  technologies. 
Farmers  who  adopt  no-till  agriculture  balance  costs 
(lower  yields,  higher  chemical  outlays)  against 
benefits (labour and machinery savings due to reduced 
field  operations,  and  carbon  payments  if  any).
2  If 
output  prices  (or  chemical  costs)  rise  because  of 
greater demand for energy crops, say, no-till is a less 
attractive option. An increase in the opportunity cost 
of  zero  tillage  could  tip  the  farmer  back  to  using 
conventional  tillage,  thus  releasing  carbon  stored  in 
soils.  Given  that  costs  of  conservation  tillage  have 
declined dramatically in the past several decades, it is 
questionable  whether  increases  in  soil  carbon  that 
result from conservation tillage can even be counted 
towards Kyoto targets, simply because they cannot be 
considered  additional  as  farmers  undertake  them  to 
reduce costs and conserve soil, and not to sequester 
carbon per se.  
It is not uniformly true that zero tillage sequesters 
more  carbon  than  conventional  tillage,  since  less 
residue  is  available  for  conversion  to  soil  organic 
carbon in arid regions [15], which affects the costs of 
creating carbon credits. Some cost estimates based on 
meta-analyses of 52 studies of soil carbon flux and 51 
studies of cost differences between conventional and 
                                                         
2 We focus on zero tillage because reduced tillage does not lower 
atmospheric  CO2  as  the  carbon  stored  in  soils  is  offset  by  that 
released by increased production, transportation and application of 
chemicals  [14].  A  synthesis  of  carbon  sequestration,  carbon 
emissions,  and net carbon flux in agriculture: Comparing tillage 
practices in the United States. Given the risk that carbon stored in 
soils is released when economic conditions change, reduced tillage 
may actually increase overall CO2 emissions.  
zero  tillage  are  provided  in  Table  2.  The  estimates 
omit  the  increased  emissions  related  to  greater 
chemical use and the transaction costs associated with 
measurement  and  monitoring.  With  the  exception, 
perhaps,  of  the  U.S.  South,  the  cost  of  generating 
carbon credits by changing agronomic practices is not 
very competitive with emissions reduction if it costs 
$20 per tCO2. 
Table 2 Cost of Creating Carbon Credits via Zero Tillage 
Agriculture, $ per metric ton of CO2;  
Source: Adapted from [15] 
Region  Wheat  Other Crops 
U.S. South  $3 to $4  $½ to $1 
Prairies  $105 to >$500  $41 to $57 
U.S. Corn Belt  $39 to $51  $23 to $24 
 
While the Kyoto Protocol permits various terrestrial 
options, particularly ones related to biological sinks, 
its main focus is on the avoidance of greenhouse gas 
emissions,  especially  CO2  emissions  associated  with 
the  burning  of  fossil  fuels.  What  are  the  long-term 
consequences  of  reducing  current  fossil  fuel  use? 
Some argue that, by leaving fossil fuels in the ground, 
their eventual use is only delayed and, as with carbon 
sequestered  in  a  terrestrial  sink,  results  in  the  same 
obligation for the future [8]. The reasoning behind this 
is that the price path of fossil fuels will be lower in the 
future  because,  by  reducing  use  today,  more  fossil 
fuels are available in the future. However, if society 
commits  to  de-carbonizing  the  economy,  behaviour 
changes and technology evolves in ways that reduce 
future demand for fossil fuels, much as wood used by 
locomotives was replaced by coal and then by diesel. 
Carbon in terrestrial sinks, on the other hand, always 
has the potential to be released.  
The appropriate way to deal with this problem is to 
count  removals  of  CO2  from  the  atmosphere  and 
emissions reduction on the same footing. A credit is 
earned  by  removing  CO2  from  the  atmosphere  and 
storing it in a terrestrial sink. The credit is the mirror 
image of an emissions reduction – one removes CO2 
from the atmosphere, the other avoids putting it there 
to  begin  with.  However,  if  agricultural  practices  or 
land use change, or a forest is harvested, any carbon 
not stored in products but released to the atmosphere is 
debited  (in  the  same  way  as  emissions  from  fossil 
fuels).  Likewise,  any  carbon  released  by  decay  of   5 
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wood  products,  or  any  soil  carbon  released  to  the 
atmosphere,  is  counted  as  a  debit  at  the  time  of 
release. If harvested fiber is burned in lieu of fossil 
fuels, a debit is also incurred but it is offset by the 
credit  earned  when  growing  biomass  removes  CO2 
from  the  atmosphere:  The  net  benefit  from  biomass 
energy production is the reduction in CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuel burning. The main difference between 
emissions  reduction  and  carbon  uptake  and  release 
from  a  terrestrial  sink  relates  to  measurement  and 
monitoring, which greatly increase transaction costs.  
What  about  forest  conservation  or  avoidance  of 
deforestation,  which  accounts  for  more  than  one-
quarter of all anthropogenic emissions? In some ways 
this is similar to the emissions situation. Credits can 
only be earned through emissions avoidance if there is 
a target level of emissions and emissions are below the 
target.  Without  a  target,  emissions  avoidance  is 
nothing more than  avoidance of debits.  True  credits 
can  only  be  earned  by  removing  CO2  from  the 
atmosphere. While it may be possible to mitigate CO2 
emissions  by  delaying  (perhaps  indefinitely) 
deforestation,  there  can  be  no  credit  for  doing  so 
unless  there  is  some  target  level  of  deforestation  so 
that, just as in the case of emissions avoidance, one 
gets credits by being below the target. Otherwise, the 
only benefit results from the avoidance of debits.  
There are some problems with this solution to the 
duration  problem.  First,  accounting  for  CO2  uptake 
and  release  from  terrestrial  sinks  requires 
measurement  and  monitoring,  both  of  which  are 
imprecise  and  expensive.  This  is  the  biggest  strike 
against the use of terrestrial ecosystem sinks. Second, 
in the real world, countries have already agreed how 
they will address mitigation, and the existing Kyoto 
agreement permits carbon sequestration in ecosystems 
to  count  toward  country  targets.  Kyoto  also  has  a 
definitive time frame, the commitment period 2008-
2012,  so  policy  makers  had  to  decide  the  fate  of 
ephemeral sinks that could release large amounts of 
CO2 after 2012. To the extent possible, they did this 
by  holding  countries  responsible  for  carbon  held  in 
sinks at the end of the period. But this is simply the 
duration problem in another guise – terrestrial carbon 
storage  is  somehow  less  permanent  than  emissions 
reduction. 
There  exist  several  proposals  for  addressing  the 
duration problem. Partial instead of full credits can be 
provided  for  storing  carbon  based  on  the  perceived 
risk that carbon will be released from a sink at some 
future  date.  The  buyer  or  seller  may  be  required  to 
take out an insurance policy,  where the insurer  will 
compensate for the losses associated with unexpected 
carbon release [16]. Alternatively, the buyer or seller 
can assure that the temporary activity will be followed 
by one that results in permanent emission reductions.  
The ton-years approach specifies that emissions can 
be  compensated  for  by  removing  CO2  from  the 
atmosphere and storing it for a period before releasing 
it  back  to  the  atmosphere.  The  conversion  rate 
between ton-years of (temporary) carbon sequestration 
and permanent tons of emissions reduction is specified 
in advance [17, 18]. The rate ranges from 42 to 150 
ton-years of temporary storage to cover one permanent 
ton (and is based on forest rotation ages). Rather than 
the authority establishing a conversion factor, market 
forces might be relied on to determine the conversion 
rate  between  (permanent)  emissions  reduction  and 
temporary removals of CO2 from the atmosphere [9, 
10].  However,  temporary  credits  are  likely  to  be 
discounted quite highly because of greater uncertainty 
(due  to  the  risk  of  unanticipated  release  of  stored 
carbon),  higher  transaction  costs  (related  to 
measurement and monitoring), and seller-host liability 
for the sink at the end of the contract period (reducing 
supply of sink-related carbon uptake services).  
The instrument adopted by the UNFCC for forestry 
projects  under  the  CDM  is  the  temporary  certified 
emission  reduction  unit,  denoted  tCER.  A  tCER  is 
purchased for a set period of time and, upon expiry, 
has  to  be  covered  by  substitute  credits  or  reissued 
credits if the original project is continued. Transaction 
costs  are  high  because  monitoring  and  verification 
(measurement)  are  more  onerous  and  international 
bookkeeping will be required to keep track of credits. 
Countries  can  obtain  carbon  credits  early,  while 
delaying  payment  to  a  future  date  (a  problem 
discussed further below).    6 
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III. COMPARING CARBON CREDIT VALUES 
WHEN DURATION DIFFERS ACROSS PROJECTS 
Consider a comparison between two climate change 
mitigation  options,  neither  of  which  results  in 
permanent  removal  of  CO2  from  the  atmosphere. 
Suppose  that  the  more  permanent  of  the  two,  say  a 
policy  that  leads  to  a  lower  current  rate  of  CO2 
emissions,  leads  to  an  increase  in  CO2  emissions  N 
years from now, as argued by Herzog et al. [8]; the 
more  ephemeral  project  generates  temporary  offset 
credits  through  sequestration  of  CO2  in  a  forest 
ecosystem,  but  releases  the  CO2  in  n  years.  (The 
comparison could just as well be between two carbon 
sequestration  projects  of  different  durations.)  What 
then is the value of a forest-sink offset credit relative 
to an emissions reduction credit? Suppose that a unit 
of CO2 not in the atmosphere is currently worth $q, 
but that the shadow price rises at an annual rate γ<r, 
where  r  is  the  discount  rate.  Then  the  value  of 
emissions reduction is: 
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while a sink offset would be worth some proportion α 
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Upon taking the ratio of (2) to (1) and simplifying, we 

































,            (3) 
which  depends  on  the  discount  rate  (r),  the  time  it 
takes  a  ton  of  CO2  stored  in  a  forest  ecosystem  to 
return to the atmosphere (n), and the time it takes a ton 
of CO2 not emitted today to increase emissions at a 
future date (N). Notice that the value does not depend 
on the price of carbon (q). As indicated in Table 3, the 
proportional  value  of  a  sink  credit  to  an  emissions 
reduction  credit  (α)  varies  depending  on  the 
relationship between n and N, the discount rate, and 
the  growth  rate  (γ)  in  damages  from  atmospheric 
concentrations  of  CO2.  It  is  possible  to  prove  some 
general results. 
Table 3: Value of a Temporary Relative to a Permanent 
Carbon Credit (α), Various Scenarios; 
Note: n.a. indicates not applicable as  
calculation cannot be made 
2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10%
0.01 0.023 0.048 0.091 0.040 0.093 0.174 0.094 0.216 0.379
0.05 0.109 0.218 0.379 0.183 0.386 0.614 0.390 0.705 0.908
0.10 0.208 0.389 0.615 0.333 0.623 0.851 0.629 0.913 0.991
0.15 0.298 0.523 0.761 0.457 0.769 0.943 0.774 0.974 0.999
0.20 0.379 0.628 0.851 0.558 0.858 0.978 0.862 0.992 1.000
0.25 0.453 0.710 0.908 0.641 0.913 0.991 0.916 0.998 1.000
0.30 0.520 0.775 0.943 0.709 0.947 0.997 0.949 0.999 1.000
0.01 0.016 0.039 0.082 0.023 0.075 0.157 0.048 0.177 0.347
0.05 0.077 0.180 0.347 0.109 0.322 0.574 0.220 0.621 0.882
0.10 0.150 0.329 0.574 0.208 0.540 0.819 0.392 0.857 0.986
0.15 0.219 0.451 0.722 0.297 0.688 0.923 0.526 0.946 0.998
0.20 0.285 0.551 0.819 0.378 0.789 0.967 0.631 0.979 1.000
0.25 0.348 0.634 0.882 0.452 0.857 0.986 0.713 0.992 1.000
0.30 0.408 0.703 0.923 0.519 0.903 0.994 0.778 0.997 1.000
0.01 n.a. 0.030 0.073 n.a. 0.056 0.140 n.a. 0.135 0.314
0.05 n.a. 0.143 0.315 n.a. 0.252 0.530 n.a. 0.516 0.849
0.10 n.a. 0.266 0.530 n.a. 0.441 0.779 n.a. 0.765 0.977
0.15 n.a. 0.373 0.678 n.a. 0.583 0.896 n.a. 0.886 0.997
0.20 n.a. 0.466 0.780 n.a. 0.688 0.951 n.a. 0.945 0.999
0.25 n.a. 0.546 0.849 n.a. 0.768 0.977 n.a. 0.973 1.000
0.30 n.a. 0.615 0.897 n.a. 0.827 0.989 n.a. 0.987 1.000
0.01 n.a. 0.015 0.055 n.a. 0.022 0.106 n.a. 0.047 0.245
0.05 n.a. 0.076 0.245 n.a. 0.107 0.429 n.a. 0.215 0.754
0.10 n.a. 0.148 0.431 n.a. 0.204 0.674 n.a. 0.383 0.939
0.15 n.a. 0.217 0.571 n.a. 0.293 0.814 n.a. 0.516 0.985
0.20 n.a. 0.283 0.677 n.a. 0.373 0.894 n.a. 0.621 0.996
0.25 n.a. 0.345 0.757 n.a. 0.446 0.939 n.a. 0.704 0.999
0.30 n.a. 0.405 0.817 n.a. 0.512 0.965 n.a. 0.768 1.000
Growth rate of shadow price of carbon, ã=0.01
Growth rate of shadow price of carbon, ã=0.02












Proposition 1: For fixed and finite N>0, as n/N→0, 
the value of temporary storage relative to permanent 
emissions reduction goes to zero. The more ephemeral 
a  sink  project,  the  less  valuable  it  is  relative  to 
emissions reduction. 
 
Proof:  This  proposition  is  obvious.  Nonetheless, 
differentiate equation (3) with respect to n and N, and 
sign the results.   7 
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  .       (5) 
The reason for the signs is that the natural logarithm of 
a number less than 1 is negative (recall γ<r). Clearly, 
as the length of temporary storage decreases relative to 
the  ‘permanent’  CO2  emission  reduction,  result  (4) 
indicates that the value of a temporary sink relative to 
an emission reduction falls  (because all other things 
are held constant – the ceteris paribus condition); thus, 
for a given N, as n/N→0, α→0. Likewise, the value of 
a  temporary  sink  decreases  as  the  ‘duration’  of  an 
emission  reduction  (N)  increases,  ceteris  paribus, 
because the period of sequestration (n) becomes too 
small to have any value. This might well be the case 
for carbon stored in soil as a result of zero tillage.  
Proposition  2:  For  fixed  n/N,  an  increase  in  N 
narrows  the  difference  in  importance  between  an 
emissions  reduction  and  a  carbon  sequestration 
activity, ceteris paribus. An increase in N ‘lengthens’ 
n  so  that,  with  discounting,  the  eventual  release  of 
stored carbon (at time n) is valued much less today. If 
N→∞  so  that  an  emission  reduction  is  truly 
permanent,  then  the  value  of  temporary  storage 
depends  only  on  the  length  of  time  that  carbon  is 
sequestered.  
 
Proof:  The  second  term  in  the  denominator  of  (3) 
approaches  0  as  N→∞,  so  that  the  value  of  a 
temporary  sink  credit  relative  to  a  permanent  one 
depends only on n (given γ and r). Since storage is not 
infinite, temporary offsets will always be less valuable 
than permanent emission reductions.  
Proposition 3: The value of storage increases with the 
discount rate (∂α/∂r>0), as illustrated in Table 3. The 
reason that ephemeral activities are more important 
relative  to  emission  reductions  as  the  discount  rate 
increases is because the inevitable release of sink CO2 
at  some  future  date  is  weighted  much  less  than  the 
early sequestration. Thus, a policy requiring the use of 
low  discount  rates  for  evaluating  climate  change 
activities militates against carbon uptake in terrestrial 
sinks. 
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which holds for all n, N > 0, n<N and γ<r. The proof is 
numerical.  Clearly,  if  n=N, 
r  
  
=0.  Assume  r=0.04 
and  γ  =0.02.  Then,  if  n=1  and  N=2,  we  find  ½ 
>0.4951; if n=50 and N=100, ½ >0.2747; if n=250 and 
N=500, ½ >0.0077; and so on.  
Proposition 4: As the rate at which the shadow price 
of carbon (γ) increases, the value of temporary storage 
relative  to  a  ‘permanent’  emission  reduction 
decreases. This implies that landowners would supply 
less carbon when the price of carbon is rising over 
time. 
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The result ∂α/∂γ<0 can only be proven numerically. 








     
 
 





     
 
 













, which holds in all cases as 
indicated in Proposition 3. Thus, ∂α/∂γ<0. Now denote 
by S(α, P; Z) the supply of carbon sink credits, where 
α is the relative price of ‘temporary’ (short duration) 
versus ‘permanent’ (long duration) credits (as before), 
P is a vector of carbon input prices and the price of a 
permanent credit, and Z is a vector of characteristics 
that describes the offset project.  0





  Z P
 
because supply of sink credits increases as their price 
increases. Then, because ∂α/∂γ<0, S(α, P; Z) shifts 
down when the rate of the carbon price increase goes 
up.  
Proposition 5: The minimum value of a carbon sink 
credit relative to an emission reduction credit equals 
the ratio of the lifetimes of the ‘temporary’ and 
‘permanent’ credits, n/N.  
Proof: Only γ<r is possible because, if γ>r, economic 
agents would pursue climate mitigation (by purchasing 
carbon sink credits) to such an extent that the rate of 
growth  in  atmospheric  CO2  (the  price  of  carbon 
credits)  falls  enough  to  equalize  γ  and  r.  Consider 
r→






= Nq and (2) 






= nq, so that α=n/N.  
IV. DISCUSSION 
The  forgoing  results  have  important  policy 
implications that relate to the duration problem. It is 
clear that sink offset credits cannot generally be traded 
one-for-one for emission reduction credits, even if the 
latter  are  not  considered  permanent;  nor  can  credits 
from  different  sink  projects  be  traded  one-for-one 
without some adjustment for duration (say using Table 
3). The conversion rate will depend on the length of 
time  that  each  project  keeps  CO2  out  of  the 
atmosphere, and, crucially, on the discount rate. For 
example,  if  a  sequestration  project  can  ensure  that 
carbon remains sequestered for 10 years, it is worth 
only  0.11  of  an  emission  reduction  that  ensures  no 
future  increase  in  emissions  for  200  years  if  the 
discount rate (r) is 2% and the growth rate of damages 
(γ) is 1% (Table 3).  
When  the  damages  from  atmospheric 
concentrations  of  CO2  (shadow  carbon  prices)  rise 
over time, the value of temporary sequestration will 
also fall. As a consequence, there might be a reduced 
demand  for  short-term  sequestration.  If  the  rate  of 
increase rises, landowners will further delay investing 
in land-use activities that create carbon credits so as to 
obtain  a  higher  price  in  the  next  period  (see 
proposition 4). Equivalently, a landowner is willing to 
delay  an  investment  in  a  carbon  sink  activity  if the 
opportunity  cost  of  time  falls,  which  essentially 
happens  when  CO2  damages  rise  over  time  (the 
shadow price γ increases). 
Given  the  difficulty  of  determining  not  only  the 
discount rate and the growth rate in damages, but also 
the uncertainty surrounding n and N, it will simply not 
be possible for the authority to determine a conversion 
factor between activities leading to carbon credits of 
differing duration. Perhaps one can rely on the market 
to determine conversion rates, but even the market will 
have  difficulty  resolving  all  uncertainty.  In  the 
absence  of  a  certifying  authority  that  guarantees 
equivalence  and  thereby  resolves  uncertainty,  sink 
credits will be worth a lot less. To judge sink projects 
in the absence of market data requires that the analyst 
make arbitrary judgments about the discount rate, the 
rate of increase in damages, and the conversion rate 
between projects to remove CO2 from the atmosphere 
to account for differing durations. These are over and 
above  assumptions  and  uncertainty  related  to 
vegetation  growth  rates,  uptake  of  carbon  in  soils, 
wildfire, disease, pests and so forth, the  majority of 
which are not explicitly spelled out in most analyses of 
terrestrial sink projects.   9 
12
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While some  advocate for the use of low discount 
rates,  we  demonstrated  that  low  rates  of  discount 
militate against terrestrial sink activities (proposition 
3).  We  do  not  know  the  rate  at  which  economic 
damages increase as more anthropogenic emissions of 
CO2 enter the  atmosphere.  If the  rate of increase in 
damages equals or exceeds the discount rate, then CO2 
offset credits from sink activities are only worth n/N of 
an emissions-reduction credit (proposition 5). This is 
equivalent  to  assuming  a  zero  discount  rate  for 
physical  carbon.
3  But  this  implies  that  temporary 
offsets from biological sink activities are overvalued 
because,  as  N→∞,  the  value  of  a  temporary  offset 
credit  falls  to  zero.  It  is  reasonable  to  assume  that 
N→∞  if  an  emissions-reduction  policy  results  in 
behavioural changes that cause permanent reductions 
in  CO2  emissions  (e.g.,  car  manufacturers  stop 
producing SUVs as people demand smaller vehicles). 
Finally,  a  country  that  uses  carbon  sequestration 
credits  to  achieve  some  proportion  of  its  CO2 
emissions-reduction  target  during  Kyoto’s  first 
commitment period has avoided emissions reductions. 
If  it  is  to  remain  committed  to  long-term  climate 
mitigation,  however,  the  country  must  increase  its 
emissions-reduction  target  in  the  next  commitment 
period. It must meet that target plus the shortfall from 
the  previous  period  –  it  still  needs  to  reduce  the 
emissions  that  were  covered  by  forestry  activities. 
Further, the country is technically liable for ensuring 
that  the  stored  carbon  remains  there,  which  will  be 
difficult given the non-permanence of forest sinks. For 
example, a country that relies on forest sinks for one-
third of a 6% reduction in emissions and commits to a 
further  7%  reduction  for  the  second  commitment 
period  must  still  reduce  emissions  in  the  second 
commitment period by an incredible 11%. It has only 
reduced emissions by 4% in the first period, and must 
thus reduce emissions by 9% during its second period 
commitment. But, as the forest sink releases its carbon 
to  the  atmosphere,  the  country  must  also  cover  that 
loss,  which  amounts  to  a  further  2%  reduction  in 
emissions.  The  temporal  shifting  in  the  emissions-
reduction burden caused by reliance on carbon sinks 
therefore  results  in  an  onerous  obligation  for  future 
                                                         
3 For a discussion of discounting physical carbon in this context 
see [19] and [20]. 
generations,  one  which  they  may  not  be  willing  to 
accept.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The main argument of this paper is that terrestrial 
ecosystem activities to generate CO2 offset credits are 
a distraction from the actual job of mitigating climate 
change. While there is no question that carbon can be 
stored in terrestrial sinks, and that care should be taken 
to  foster  such  sinks  and  ensure  that  carbon  is  not 
unwontedly  and  needlessly  released  (e.g.,  via 
deforestation),  this  is  no  reason  to  justify  their 
inclusion  in  international  agreements  to  mitigate 
climate  change  or  in  international  trading  schemes. 
There are simply too many obstacles to warrant their 
consideration.  Measurement,  monitoring  and 
verification of sink activities is particularly difficult, 
serving  to  raise  transaction  costs.  Rent  seeking  by 
opportunistic  sellers  of  carbon  credits,  and  even  by 
environmental  groups,  highlights  another  important 
problem:  terrestrial  sinks  remove  CO2  from  the 
atmosphere at different rates and store it for varying 
lengths of time, with both removal rates and storage 
times  embodying  significant  uncertainty,  thereby 
facilitating  dubious  claims  of  sink  carbon  offset 
credits.  While  this  duration  problem  can  readily  be 
solved  (e.g.,  taxing  emissions  and  subsidizing 
removals  at  the  time  they  occur),  given  the  high 
transaction costs of including sink activities and the 
reluctance of countries to make sinks work, the only 
conclusion is that terrestrial ecosystem sink activities 
should not be included in international agreements to 
mitigate climate change. 
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